We use the system of p-adic numbers for the description of information processes. Basic objects of our models are so called transformers of information, basic processes are information processes, the statistics are information statistics (thus we present a model of information reality). The classical and quantum mechanical formalisms on information p-adic spaces are developed. It seems that classical and quantum mechanical models on p-adic information spaces can be applied for the investigation of flows of information in cognitive and social systems, since a p-adic metric gives quite natural description of the ability to form associations.
Introduction
We develop classical and quantum formalisms on information spaces. Basic objects of this model are so called transformers of information; basic processes are information processes. Our main aim is a description of classical and quantum dynamics of information states.
This information dynamics may be fruitful in the study of cognitive, psychological and social processes. Here flows of information are more important than flows of matter. We think that it would be possible to explain some aspects of the process of thinking and psychological, social and anomalous phenomena on the basis of our model. Thus the readers who are only interested in applications to cognitive sciences, sociology and psychology may consider our model as only a new apparatus to investigate these phenomena.
Our model of information reality can be considered as an attempt to extend the standard model of physical reality. We interpret material objects as a particular class of transformers of information (which are characterized by stable or slowly changing information states). On the other hand, our model might be used for the description of information flows which are not directly related to flows of matter. These are conscious, social (and even anomalous) information processes.
Different models of information and cognitive reality have been discussed by many scientists in relation to foundations of quantum physics [1] - [7] , cognitive sciences and psychology [8] - [11] and anomalous phenomena [12] - [17] .
We use a new mathematical apparatus to describe information reality ("the world of ideas"). Many authors discuss the idea that such "ideal" objects as ideas, consciousness, information can play an important role to provide the right picture of physical reality. However, typically they use (with some modifications) the standard mathematical model based on the description of physical reality by real numbers. In particular, many of them discuss a "conscious field", but they try to describe this object as a new field on the standard real space-time. We think that some of cognitive processes could not be described by using the real model of physical reality. There is simply no place for such phenomena in this model. The real model was created to describe a particular class of physical phenomena (material objects). This model does not play an exceptional role. We need not try to input all physical phenomena into this real model of reality. There can be other models of physical reality. We propose to describe physical reality by using information spaces (see Appendix 1) .
From our viewpoint real spaces (Newton's absolute space or spaces of general relativity) give only a particular class of information spaces. These real information spaces are characterized by the special system for the coding of information and the special distance on the space of vectors of information. Any natural number m > 1 can be chosen as the basis of the coding system. Each x ∈ [0, 1] can be presented in the form:
x = a 0 a 1 ...a n ... ,
where a j = 1, ..., m − 1, are digits. We denote the set of all sequences of the form (1) 
In fact, this identification is closely connected with the order structure on the real line R (and the metric related to this order structure). For each x, there exist "right" and "left" neighborhoods; there exist arbitrary small right and left shifts. The identification (2) is connected with the description of left neighborhoods. This nearness has a natural information interpretation: (AS) implies the ability to form associations for cognitive systems which use this nearness to compare vectors of information. By (AS) two communications (two ideas in a model of human thinking, [18] - [20] ) which have the same codes for sufficiently large number of first (the most important) positions in cording sequences are identified by a comparator of a cognitive system. Numbers (vectors of information) which are close to x from the left hand side could not be characterized in the same way (see Example 1.1, there x and y are very close but their codes differ strongly).
Conclusion. The system of real numbers has been created as a coding system for information which the consciousness receives from reality. The main properties of this coding system are the order structure on the set of information vectors 2 and the restricted ability (see (AS) ) to form associations.
Finally, we pay attention to the "universal coding property" of the real system: any natural number m > 1 can be used as the basis of this system. Thus it is assumed that any information process can be equivalently described by using, for example, 2-bits coding or 1997-bits coding.
All these properties of the real coding system were incorporated in every physical model 3 . I do not think that all information processes have an order structure. On the other hand, the scale of coding system m > 1 may play an important role in a description of an information process.
Let us "modify" the real coding system. We eliminate the identification (2) . Since now, there is no order structure on the set X m of information vectors. We consider on X m the nearness defined by (AS) 4 . This nearness can be described by a metric. The corresponding (complete) metric space is isomorphic to the ring of so called m-adic integers Z m (see [21] and section 2). Therefore it is natural to use m-adic numbers for a description of information processes. Mathematically it is convenient to use prime numbers m = p > 1 (see [21] ). We arrive to the domain of an extended mathematical formalism, p-adic analysis.
To use p-adic numbers in physics is not a new idea (see [22] - [40] ). A new idea is to use them for a description of information (in particular, cognitive [18] ) processes. On the other hand, apparatus which has been developed in p-adic quantum physics may be fruitfully used in our model.
We develop a quantum formalism for information systems. The mathematical basis for this formalism has been presented in [29] , [18] , [37] , [34] , [35] . In this paper we apply the p-adic quantum formalism to information systems. As in ordinary quantum mechanics over the reals, the problem of an interpretation plays the important role in information quantum mechanics.
Of course, all difficulties of an interpretation of the ordinary quantum theory (see, for example, [6] , [41] - [45] ) are reproduced in the information quantum theory. There are many viewpoints on an interpretation of the quantum theory (which may be very different). However, they are mainly based on the following two general interpretations of a quantum state: (1) an individual (or orthodox Copenhagen) interpretation by which a quantum state provides the complete description an individual quantum system; (2) an ensemble (or statistical) interpretation by which a quantum state provides the description of a statistical ensemble of quantum systems. In fact, by analysing the process of measurement for information quantum systems we understood that we have to follow the ensemble interpretation. This analysis might be also useful for better understanding of the ordinary quantum formalism on real space.
Systems of p-adic numbers
First we present some facts about p-adic numbers.
The field of real numbers R is constructed as the completion of the field of rational numbers Q with respect to the metric ρ(x, y) = |x−y|, where |·| is the usual valuation given by the absolute value. The fields of p-adic numbers Q p are constructed in a corresponding way, but using other valuations. For a prime number p, the p-adic valuation |·| p is defined in the following way. First we define it for natural numbers. Every natural number n can be represented as the product of prime numbers, n = 2 r 2 3 r 3 · · · p rp · · ·, and we define |n| p = p −rp , writing |0| p = 0 and | − n| p = |n| p . We then extend the definition of the p-adic valuation | · | p to all rational numbers by setting |n/m| p = |n| p /|m| p for m = 0. The completion of Q with respect to the metric ρ p (x, y) = |x−y| p is the locally compact field of p-adic numbers Q p . The number fields R and Q p are unique in a sense, since by Ostrovsky's theorem (see [21] ) | · | and | · | p are the only possible valuations on Q, but have quite distinctive properties.
Unlike the absolute value distance | · |, the p-adic valuation satisfies the strong triangle inequality |x
Write U r (a) = {x ∈ Q p : |x − a| p ≤ r} and U − r (a) = {x ∈ Q p : |x − a| p < r}, where r = p n and n = 0, ±1, ±2, . . .. These are the "closed" and "open" balls in Q p while the sets S r (a) = {x ∈ K : |x − a| p = r} are the spheres in Q p of such radii r. These sets (balls and spheres) have a somewhat strange topological structure from the viewpoint of our usual Euclidean intuition: they are both open and closed at the same time, and as such are called clopen sets. Another interesting property of p-adic balls is that two balls have nonempty intersection if and only if one of them is contained in the other. Also, we note that any point of a p-adic ball can be chosen as its center, so such a ball is thus not uniquely characterized by its center and radius. Finally, any p-adic ball U r (0) is an additive subgroup of Q p , while the ball U 1 (0) is also a ring, which is called the ring of p-adic integers and is denoted by Z p .
Any x ∈ Q p has a unique canonical expansion (which converges in the
where the a j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} are the "digits" of the p-adic expansion. The elements x ∈ Z p have the expansion x = a 0 + · · · + a k p k + · · · and can thus be identified with the sequences of digits
. The series converges in
p-adic trigonometric functions sin x and cos x are defined by the standard power series. These series have the same radius of convergence r p as the exponential series. If, instead of a prime number p, we start with an arbitrary natural number m > 1 we construct the system of so called m-adic numbers Q m by completing Q with respect to the m-adic metric ρ m (x, y) = |x − y| m which is defined in a similar way to above. However, this system is in general not a field as there may exist divisors of zero.
Dynamics on information spaces
The rings of p-adic integers Z p can be used as mathematical models for information spaces. Each element x = ∞ j=0 α j p j can be identified with a sequence
Such sequences are interpreted as coding sequences (in the alphabet A p = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} with p letters) for some amounts of information. The padic metric ρ p (x, y) = |x − y| p on Z p corresponds to the nearness (AS) for information sequences. We choose the space X = Z p (or multidimensional spaces X = Z N p ) for the description of information. The X is said to be information space.
Everywhere below we shall use the abbreviation "I" for the word information (for example, information space = I-space).
Remark 3.1. Different information phenomena can be described by different mathematical models for I-spaces. The p-adic model for I-spaces is the simplest from the mathematical point of view.
Objects which "live" in I-spaces are said to be transformers of information (I-transformers). I-transformers are not characterized by localization in information p-adic space (or real space). They are characterized by the ability to receive an external information and transform it in a new information.
Each I-transformer τ has internal clocks. A state of the clocks is described by an I-vector t ∈ T = Z p which is called information time. The I-time can have different interpretations in different I-models. If τ is a conscious system then t is (self-recognized) time of the evolution of this system. We can say about psychological time of an individual or about (collective) social time of a group of individuals. In fact, we have not to image t as an ordered sequence of time counts. This is only information with describes evolution of τ. In principle, there is no direct relation between I-time and "physical" time that is used in the model over the reals.
At each instant t ∈ T of I-time there is defined a total information state (I-state) q(t) ∈ X of τ. It describes the position of τ in the I-space X. The "life"-trajectory of τ can be identified with the trajectory q(t) in X.
An I-transformer can be imagine as a kind of Turing machine. Let us consider a free I-transformer τ fr (i.e., an I-transformer which does not interact with other I-transformers and I-fields). At the instant of I-time t the τ fr has the I-state q(t) = (α 0 (t), α 1 (t), ..., α k (t), ...) (an infinite ribbon with symbols belonging to the alphabet A p = {0, 1, ..., p − 1}). During an I-time interval ∆t this state is transformed in a new state q(t + ∆t) = (α 0 (t + ∆t), α 1 (t + ∆t), ..., α k (t + ∆t), ...) (a new infinite ribbon with symbols belonging to the alphabet A p ). The law of transformation depends on internal I-parameters s which determine the internal structure of τ fr . In the general case an I-transformer τ interact with other Itransformers τ j , j = 1, ..., N and I-fields φ i (x), i = 1, ..., M. These interactions change continuously internal I-parameters s = s(t, q τ j (t)), φ i (q τ (t))).
For example, a cognitive system τ which is isolated from external I-flows can be considered as a free I-transformer τ fr . Here q(t) gives the evolution of τ fr in 'space of ideas'; I-parameters s are determined by the neural structure of τ fr . In general case the cognitive system τ fr interact with other cognitive systems and material objects (the latter interactions are also considered by τ fr as I-interactions) and I-fields. These interactions change continuously (with respect to I-time of τ fr ) the transformation law, q(t) → q(t + ∆t).
We consider now the motion of a material particle τ from the I-viewpoint. At the moment we restrict our consideration to classical one dimensional motions. We identify the total I-state q of a particle τ with the spatial coordinate of this particle. q ∈ Z p has the form q = α 0 + α 1 p + · · · + α m p m + · · · . This representation can be considered as the expansion of the distance q in the p-scale. The main difference from the real model of the motion of τ is discreetness of space. There is the minimal length element l = 1. The particle τ could not be observed on distances which are less than l = 1. Other difference is that q can yield infinitely large values (these are q for which α j = 0 for an infinite number of j). Thus the realization of I-space as spatial space does not reproduce the ordinary model of motion in continuous real space. It gives a model of motion in discrete space. The ordinary physical interactions can realized in this space (see [18] , [29] , [34]- [36] ). In this way they can be interpreted as I-interactions.
We develop an analogue of the Hamiltonian dynamics on the I-spaces 5 As usual, we introduce the quantity p(t) =q(t) (= d dt q(t)) which is the information analogue of the momentum. However, here we prefer to use a physiological terminology. The quantity p(t) is said to be a motivation (for changing of the I-state q(t)).
The space Z p × Z p of points z = (q, p) where q is the I-state and p is the motivation is said to be a phase I-space. As in the ordinary Hamiltonian formalism, we assume that there exists a function H(q, p) (I-Hamiltonian) on the phase I-space which determines the motion of τ in the phase I-space:
The I-Hamiltonian H(p, q) has the meaning of an I-energy. In principle, I-energy is not related to the usual physical energy.
If τ is a (material) particle, then (5), (6) gives the Hamiltonian dynamics for the particle; here q(t) is the spatial coordinate of the particle in discrete space and p(t) is the momentum of the particle (which is also discrete). If τ is a cognitive system, then (5), (6) gives the Hamiltonian dynamics for the cognitive system in the 'space of ideas'.
The simplest I-Hamiltonian H fr (p) = αp 2 , α ∈ Z p describes the motion of a free I-transformation τ , i.e., an I-transformer which uses only selfmotivations for changing of its I-state q(t). Here by solving the system of the Hamiltonian equations we obtain: p(t) = p 0 , q(t) = q 0 + 2αp 0 (t − t 0 )
6 . The motivation p is the constant of this motion. Thus the free I-transformer "does not like" to change its motivation p 0 in the process of the motion in the I-space. If, we change coordinates, q ′ = (q − q 0 )/k, k = 2αp 0 , then we see that the dynamics of the free I-transformer coincides with the dynamics of its I-time.
If τ is a (material) particle, then p 0 is its momentum and α = 1/2m, where
is the mass of τ (which determined with a finite precision). If τ is a cognitive system, then p 0 is (internal) motivation of τ and α = 1/2m, where m is so called I-mass (see section 4).
In general case the I-energy is the sum of the I-energy of motivations H f = αp 2 (which is an analogue of the kinetic energy) and potential I-energy V (q):
The potential V (q) is determined by fields of information.
In the Hamiltonian framework we can consider interactions between Itransformers τ 1 , . . . , τ N . These I-transformers have the I-times t 1 , . . . , t N and I-states q 1 (t 1 ), . . . , q N (t N ). By our model we can describe interactions between these I-transformers only in the case in that there is a possibility to choose the same I-time t for all of them. In this case we can consider the evolution of the system of the I-transformers τ 1 , . . . , τ N as a trajectory in the
We think that this conditions of consistency for I-times of interacting I-transformers plays the crucial role in many psychological experiments. We can not obtain sensible observations for interactions between arbitrary indi-viduals. There must be a process of learning for the group τ 1 , . . . τ N which reduces I-times t 1 , . . . , t N to the unique I-time t.
Thus, let us consider a group τ 1 , . . . , τ N of I-transformers with the internal time t. The dynamics of I-states and motivations is determined by the I-
j is the total energy of motivations for the group τ 1 , . . . , τ N and V (q) is the potential energy. It is natural to choose V (q) = i =j Φ(q i −q j ), where Φ(s), s ∈ Z p , is the potential of the interaction between I-transformers.
As usual, to find a trajectory in the phase I-space
, we need to solve the system of Hamiltonian equations:
(see [29] for such equations). Consequences for cognitive and social sciences and psychology: 1. Energy and information. In our model a transmission of information is determined by the I-energy which is the sum of I-energy of motivations and potential I-energy. In principle, this process need no physical energy. Therefore, there might be transmissions of information which could not be reduced to transmissions of physical energy. In this case we cannot measure physical interactions (i.e., interactions in real space-time) between two Itransformers, τ 1 and τ 2 (but we could measure an information interaction). In particular, τ 1 and τ 2 can be individuals participating in psychological or social experiments (or even experiments which exhibit anomalous behaviour).
2. Distance and information. I-processes may evaluate in an I-space which differs from the real space (absolute Newton space or a space of general relativity). Therefore the real ("physical") distance between I-transformers does not play the crucial role in processes of I-interactions.
3. Time and information. Dynamics of information is dynamics with respect to I-time t. There may be a correspondence t phys = g(t) between real time t phys ∈ R and I-time t ∈ Z p . This correspondence may not preserve distances.
Let τ be an I-transformer having a continuous trajectory q(t). Small variations of t, t ′ = t + δt, imply small variations of q :
If (in some way) we find the internal time scale of τ, then it would be possible to find (via (8) ) its I-state at the instant of time t 4. Motivation. A motion in the I-space depends, not only on the initial I-state q 0 , but also on the initial motivation p 0 . Moreover, the Hamiltonian structure of the equations of motion implies that the motivation p(t) plays the important role in the process of the evolution. Thus I-dynamics is, in fact, dynamics in phase I-space.
5. Consistency for times. An I-interaction between I-transformers is possible only if these I-transformers have consistent I-times. Therefore every psychological or social experiment has to contain an element of "learning" for I-transformers participating in the experiment. A physical interaction need not be involved in such learning. This can be any exchange of information between individuals (or a study of information about some individual).
6. Future and past. The consistency condition for I-times does not imply such a condition for real times, because different I-transformers can have different correspondence laws for I-time and real time. For example, let us consider two I-transformers, τ 1 and τ 2 satisfying the consistency condition for I-times, i.e., t 1 = t 2 = t. We assume that it is possible to transform I-times of τ 1 and τ 2 to real times t 1,phys = g 1 (t 1 ) and t 2,phys = g 2 (t 2 ). Let us also assume that τ 1 and τ 2 interact by the I-potential V (q 1 − q 2 ), i.e., at the instant t of I-time the potential I-energy of this interaction equals V (q 1 (t) − q 2 (t)). If t 1,phys = g 1 (t) = t 2,phys = g 2 (t) then such an interaction is nothing than an interaction with the future or the past.
7. Social phenomena. By our model any social group G can be described by a system τ 1 , . . . , τ N of coupled I-transformers. There exists an I-potential V (q 1 , . . . , q N ) which determines an I-interaction between members of G. For example, democratic societies are characterized by uniform I-potentials V = Φ(q i −q j ). Here a contribution into the potential I-energy does not depend on an individual. On the other hand, hierarchic societies are characterized by I-potentials of the form:
where
The I-transformer τ 0 can be a political, national or state leader or a God.
Remark 4.1. (Transformers of information and classical real fields).
If p → ∞ then the coding alphabet {0, 1, ..., p − 1} could be thought as being continuous, i.e., it can be identified with the field of real numbers R. Therefore information space X = Z p , p → ∞, can be identified with the infinite product of real fields, X = R ∞ . Thus the I-state of an I-transformer τ can be identified with a classical field φ(x), x ∈ R (for example via Fourier coefficients). Therefore we can consider I-transformers as sources of classical fields (in the limit p → ∞). Of course, this is just a speculation, because we have no mathematical realization of this limiting procedure.
4 Information velocity, acceleration, mass and force, Newton's law.
We have considered dynamics of I-transformers of the unit mass. There the coefficient v of a proportion between the variation δq of the I-state and the variation δt of I-time t: δq = vδt, was considered as a motivation. In the general case the motivation p may not coincide with v. Let us assume that the motivation p is proportional to v, p = mv, m ∈ Z p . This coefficient m of proportion is called an I-mass. We also call v an I-velocity. Thus δq = p m δt. Let τ 1 and τ 2 be two I-transformers with the I-masses m 1 and m 2 and let |m 1 | p > |m 2 | p . Let τ 1 and τ 2 have the variations δt 1 , δt 2 of I-time of the same p-adic magnitude, |δt 1 | p = |δt 2 | p , and let these variations generate the variations δq 1 and δq 2 of their I-states of the same p-adic magnitude, |δq 1 | p = |δq 2 | p . To make such a change of the I-state, τ 1 need a larger motivation:
Thus the I-mass is a measure of an inertia of information. We define a kinetic I-energy by T = 1 2m p 2 . A variation δt of I-time t implies also a variation δp of the motivation p: δp = f δt. The coefficient f of proportionality is called an I-force. Thus any change of the motivation is due to the action of an I-force f . If f = 0 then δp = 0 for any variation δt of t. Thus an I-transformer cannot change its motivation in the absence of I-forces.
By analogue with the usual physics we call the coefficient a of a proportion between the variation δv of the I-velocity v and the variation δt of the Itime t, δv = aδt, an I-acceleration. Thus δp = amδt. This relation can be rewritten in the form of an information analogue of the second Newton law:
An I-force f is said to be a potential force if there exists a function V (q) such
where V is called the potential, or potential energy. The total I-energy H is defined as the sum of the kinetic and the potential I-energies, H(q, p) = Let the I-force f be proportional to the I-state q, f = mβ 2 q, where m is the I-mass and β ∈ Z p is a coefficient of the interaction. Here (9) gives the equationq = β 2 q.
; the Hamiltonian equations arė q = p/m andṗ = mβ 2 q. Their solutions have the form g(t) = ae βt + be −βt . By the condition (3) the I-state q(t) and motivation p(t) are defined only for instants of I-time which satisfy the inequality
This condition can be considered as a restriction for the magnitude of the I-force. If the coefficient of the interaction |β| p ≤ r p , then dynamics q(t) of the I-state is well defined for all t ∈ Z p . Larger forces imply the restriction condition for I-time. Let |β| p = 1. If p = 2 then (11) has the form t ∈ U 1/p (0), i.e., t = α 1 p + α 2 p 2 + · · ·. Thus the I-state q(t) of the I-transformer τ can be defined (observed) only for the instants of time t 0 = 0, t 1 = p, ..., t p−1 = (p − 1)p, ... . If p = 2 then (11) has the form t ∈ U 1/4 (0), i.e., and t = α 2 2 2 + α 3 2 3 + · · ·. Thus the I-state q(t) of τ can be defined (observed) only for the instants of time t 0 = 0, t 1 = 4, t 2 = 8, ... .
Let f = −mβ 2 q, i.e., V (q) = mβ 2 q 2 2 andq = −β 2 q. Here q(t) and p(t) have the form g(t) = a cos βt + b sin βt. Here we also have the restriction relation (11) . As opposite to the real case the p-adic trigonometric functions are not periodical. There is no analogue of oscillations for the I-process described by an analogue of Hooke's law.
Let us consider the solution of the Hamiltonian equations with the initial conditions q(0) = 0 and p(0) = mβ: q(t) = sin βt, p(t) = mβ cos βt. We have qp = (mβ/2) sin 2βt. By using the p-adic equality | sin a| p = |a| p we get |qp| p = |mβ| p |βt| p . The relation (11) implies
This is a restriction relation for the trajectory (q(t), p(t)) in the phase Ispace (compare with [33] ). Let β = 1/m. Then (12) gives |q| p |p| p ≤ r p . If the motivation p is strong |p| p = 1, then q can be only of the form q =
If the motivation p is rather weak then the I-state q of an I-transformer can be arbitrary.
The restriction relation (12) is natural if we apply our information model to describe psychological (social) behaviour of individuals. Strong psychological (social) motivations imply some restrictions for possible psychological (social) states q. On the other hand, if motivations are rather weak an individual can, in principle, arrive to any psychological (social) state.
We discuss the role of the I-mass in the restriction relation (12) . There the decrease of the I-mass implies more rigid restrictions for the possible I-states (for the fixed magnitude of the motivation). If we return to the psychological (social) applications we get that the individual (or a group of individuals) with a small magnitude of I-mass and the strong motivations will have quite restricted set of I-states.
The restriction relation (12) is an analogue of the Heisenberg uncertainty relations in the ordinary quantum mechanics. However, we consider a classical (i.e., not quantized) I-system. Therefore a classical I-system can have behaviour that is similar to quantum behaviour.
5 Mathematical "pathologies" in the formalism of the information mechanics and their interpretations
In p-adic analysis the condition f ≡ 0 does not imply that a differentiable function f is a constant, see [21] , [46] . Therefore, there exist very complicated continuous motions (q(t), p(t)) in the I-phase space for I-transformers with zero I-energy (q ≡ 0 orṗ ≡ 0). In psychological models these motions can be interpreted as motions without any motivation. Such motions need no information force. On the other hand, we can consider an I-potential V (q) such that ∂V ∂q = 0. Here the potential I-energy V (q) can have very complicated behaviour on the I-space X = Z p . At the same time the I-force f = 0. Thus there may exist I-fields which do not induce any I-force.
All mathematical pathologies can be eliminated by the consideration of analytical functions. If f ≡ 0 and f is analytic then f = constant.
In psychological models we can interpret analytical trajectories in the phase I-space as a "normal behaviour", i.e., an individual need a motivation for the change of a psychological state. Here we can observe some psychological (information) force which induces this change. There is a psychological (information) field which generates this force. The model puts trajectories (non-analytical) with zero motivation in relation with abnormal psychological behaviour, mental diseases and anomalous phenomena. Here an individual changes his psychological state without any motivation in the absence of any information force. Here, in fact, a p-adic generalization of the Hamiltonian formalism does not work. We need to propose a new physical formalism to describe such phenomena.
Not all unusual properties of p-adic quantities are connected with nonanalyticity. For example, in p-adic analysis we can construct polynomials of the form V (x) = α 0 + α 1 x + · · · + α N x N , where the coefficients α j are natural numbers, |α j | p = 1, such that ǫ = sup x∈Zp |V (x)| p can be arbitrary small (see [46] ). Therefore the result of the simultaneous action of quite strong I-potentials V j (x) = α j x j , j = 0, 1, ..., N, can have arbitrary small magnitude.
Information work, conservation laws
To eliminate from our consideration all "pathological" motions in the Ispace, we shall consider only I-quantities described by analytical functions. Of course, we do not claim that only analytical functions describe real information processes. We like only to simplify mathematical considerations.
Let f (x) = ∞ n=0 a n x n , a n ∈ Q p , and let the series converge for |x| p ≤ δ, δ = p ±n , n = 0, 1, . . .. We define an integral of f by the formula (see [26] ):
The series on the right-hand side converges for all |a| p , |b| p ≤ δ p
. In particular, we can find an antiderivative F of f by the formula
Let f be an I-force which is described by the function f (x) which is analytic for |x| p ≤ p. Then this force is potential with the I-potential
Let γ = {q(t), |t| p ≤ λ} be an analytic curve in Z p . We define its length element by ds = vdt, where v =q is the I-velocity. By definition
where q(t 0 ) = a and q(t 1 ) = b. The quantity W ab is said to be the work done by the external I-force f upon the I-transformer in going from the point a to the point b. By (10) we have
Thus the work done is equal to the change in the kinetic energy:
As the I-force f is potential then the work W done around a closed orbit is zero: W = f ds = 0. Thus the work W ab does not depend on an analytic trajectory γ(a, b). We also have:
We have obtained the energy conservation law for an I-transformer: if the I-forces acting on an I-transformer are described by analytical functions (in particular, they are potential), then the total energy of the I-transformer, H = T + V , is conserved. At the moment the situation with nonanalytic potential I-forces is not clear. It may be that the energy conservation law is violated in the general case.
7 Mechanics of a system of information transformers, constraints on information spaces
Let τ 1 , . . . , τ N be a system of I-transformers with I-masses, m 1 , . . . , m N ∈ Z p . As in ordinary mechanics we must distinguish between the external I-forces F (e) i acting on I-transformers due to sources outside the system and internal forces F ji . As we have already discussed, I-times t 1 , . . . , t N of τ 1 , . . . , τ N must satisfy the consistency condition:
Thus the equation of motion for the ith particle is to be written:
For some I-systems we may obey an information analogue of Newton's third law (a law of information action and reaction):
This point in the I-space is said to be the center of information of the system. If the system satisfies Newton's third law for I-forces then we get the equation of motion:
The center of information moves as if the total external Iforce was acting on the I-mass M of the system concentrated at the center of information. We introduce the motivation P = Mẋ of the I-system. There is the following conservation theorem for motions described by analytic functions (q j (t)) N j=1 , t ∈ Z p : if the total external I-force is zero, the total motivation of the I-system is conserved.
Example 7.1. (Social systems). We apply our I-model for describing a society S which consists of individuals (or groups of individuals) τ 1 , . . . , τ N . There exist the center of information of S, x S ∈ Z p which can be considered as a coding sequence for this society. If S satisfies Newton's law of actionreaction for I-forces then its evolution is determined by the external I-forces.
If this evolution is not "pathological" then the motivation of S is conserved. Of course, there might be numerous "pathological" evolutions (for example, evolutions with zero motivation, P S = 0).
For analytic motions the I-work done by all I-forces in moving the system from an initial configuration A = {a i = q i (t 0 )} to a final configuration B = {b i = q i (t 1 )} is well defined:
i is the total kinetic I-energy of the I-system. As usual T = In our model of 'social motion' (Example 7.1) we can say that the total kinetic energy of the society S is the sum of the kinetic energy of the center of information of S and the kinetic energy of motions of individuals τ j about the center of information.
We now consider the case when all I-forces are (analytical) potential: F 
-energy H = T +V is conserved for every I-system with (analytical) potential I-forces (such that F ij satisfy the law of information action-reaction).
The consideration of I-systems induces dynamics in multidimensional Ispaces; X N = Z N p . Such spaces can be useful for the description, not only systems of I-transformers, but also individual I-transformers which have multidimensional information spaces.
For example, let τ be a cognitive system and let x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ), x j ∈ Z p , be a set of ideas with which operates τ (i.e., there are N parallel thinking processes π 1 , ..., π N in τ , see [18] - [20] for the details). Then the I-dynamics for τ is described by the trajectory (q(t), p(t)) ∈ Z 2N p . As in standard mechanics, constraints play the important role in I-mechanics. The simplest constraints ("holonomic") can be expressed as equations connecting I-states of I-transformers τ 1 , . . . , τ N (or equations coupling different ideas in the cognitive system):
Here f may be a function from Z N +1 p into Z p or a function from Z N +1 p into R. The simplest constraints of the "real type" are: (C1) |q 1 − a| p = r, . . . , |q N − a| p = r, r > 0, a ∈ Z p , i.e., all I-transformers have to move over the surface of the sphere S r (a); (C2) |q 2 − q 1 | = r, . . . , |q N − q 1 | = r, i.e., there is the fixed I-transformer τ 1 such that all other I-transformers must move on the distance r from τ 1 ; (C3) We can also consider an "information rigid body", i.e., a system of I-transformers connected by constraints:
Example 7.2. (Restricted mentality). In cognitive sciences constraint (C1) can be used for the description of a "restricted mentality". All ideas q 1 (t), ..., q N (t) of a cognitive system τ (generated by the parallel processes π 1 , ..., π N ) belong to the restricted domain of ideas X = S r (a).
Example 7.3. (Ideology, religion). Let us consider the I-model of a society S with an ideology (or religion) a ∈ Z p . Then constraint (C1) can be interpreted as describing a social layer L = (τ 1 , ..., τ N ) of S. These are all individuals who accept the ideology (or religion) a with an "information precision" r. Let this precision r = 1/p k and let q j (t) = (q jα (t))
The members of L accept dogmas a 0 , ..., a k−1 of the ideology (or religion), but they deny the dogma a k . In our hierarchical model all other dogmas do not play any role. If the dogma a k is violated then the violation of a k+j would not change a status of τ j .
Example 7.4. (Evolution of an idea-fix). Let us consider a cognitive system τ with N parallel thinking processes π 1 , ..., π N . The constraint (C2) means that there is a thinking process in the cognitive system (in our case this is π 1 ) which has a strong influence on all other thinking processes π j , j = 1. They could not go far away from π 1 . In psychology π 1 may be interpreted as a process of evolution of an idea-fix. The constraint (C2) in the I-space of the cognitive system τ implies that all thinking activity of τ is connected with this idea-fix.
Example 7.5. (Kingdoms, families and lovers). The constraint (C2) can be interpreted as describing a social layer L = (τ 2 , ..., τ N ) in a kingdom K with the king τ 1 . The evolution q 1 (t) of the I-state of the king induces the information restrictions (C2) for evolutions of I-states of members of the layer L. The same constraint may be used for an information model of evolution of a family F. Here τ 1 may be the father or mother. In the case N = 2 we obtain the symmetric model which may be used for the description of a pair of lovers. Similar constraints in the I-space might explain some anomalous information connections between individuals.
Example 7.6. (Scandinavian society). The constraint (C3) may be used in social sciences for the description of "Scandinavian societies". There are nonzero distances r ij > 0, i, j = 1, ..., N, between individuals in the I-space. These distances are stable in the process of time evolution.
In the case of holonomic constraints described by the system of analytical functions: f j : Z N +1 p → Z p , j = 1, . . . , K, i.e., f j (q 1 , . . . , q N , t) = 0, we can use the technique of the standard mechanics 7 . If the equations are independent then we can introduce generalized I-coordinates ξ 1 , . . . , ξ N −K , and q l = q l (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ N −K , t) l = 1, . . . , N, and q l (ξ, t) are analytical functions of ξ and t (see [21] , [46] for the mathematical details).
Example 7.7. (Hidden basic ideas). If q(t) = (q l (t))
N l=1 describes ideas in the cognitive system at the instant t of I-time, then by resolving constraints on these ideas we can find "independent ideas" ξ(t) = (ξ j (t)) N −K j=1 which, in fact, determine the I-state of the cognitive system.
Example 7.8. (Hidden leaders). If q(t) = (q l (t))
N l=1 describes the system S = (τ 1 , . . . , τ N ) of I-transformers then the existence of generalized I-coordinates ξ can be interpreted as a possibility to reduce I-behaviour of S to I-behaviour of the other system G = (g 1 , . . . , g N −K ) of I-transformers.
As in the standard mechanics, we introduce general I-forces:
where F i is the total I-force acting to ith I-transformer (i.e.,
These methods may not be applied to constraints determined by real valued functions. However, in the latter case we need not eliminate these constraints. These constraints describe open subsets of the configuration I-space Z N p . We can choose such subsets as new configuration I-spaces.
is the sum of applied I-force F (a) i and the I-force f i of constraints 8 ). In our theory generalized I-forces have the natural interpretation (compare with the situation with generalized forces in the usual mechanics). As we have noted, the existence of generalized I-coordinates which are obtained from equations for constraints means that the initial system S = (τ 1 , . . . , τ N ) of I-transformers is "controlled" by the other system G = (g 1 , . . . , g N −K ) of I-transformers. The I-forces (15) are, in fact, reaction I-forces, i.e., the control of G over S generates I-forces applied to elements of G. By repeating of the usual computations we get the equations of motion:
If the I-forces F i are potential with the analytical potential V , i.e.,
, then generalized I-forces are also potential:
. In this case the above equation can be written in the form:
where L = T − V is the I-Lagrangian.
It is important that the equations (17) can be used to describe I-motions in the presence of an I-potential V (q,q) which depends on (generalized) Ivelocities v i =q i . In this case
and L = T − V . These velocity-dependent potentials may play an important role in Iprocesses. In particular, there might have applications in such an exotic field as anomalous phenomena. It is claimed (see, for example, [12] - [17] ) that a psychokinesis effect can be observed for some random physical processes and it cannot be observed for deterministic processes. It might be tempting to explain this phenomenon on the basis of the assumption that an I-field generated in experiments on the psychokinesis corresponds to a potential which depends on the I-velocity (thus the corresponding I-force is defined by (18) ). The I-velocity is higher for random processes. Therefore the interaction is stronger for these processes.
Quantum mechanics on information spaces
It is quite natural to quantize classical mechanics on information spaces over Z p . We give the following reasons for such quantization. Observations over Iquantities are statistical observations. We have to study statistical ensembles of I-transformers (instead studying of an individual I-transformer). Such statistical ensembles are described by quantum states φ. As usual in quantum formalism, we can assume that a value λ of an I-quantity A can be measured in the state φ with some probability P φ (A = λ). This ideology is nothing than the application of the statistical (ensemble) interpretation of quantum mechanics (see, for example, [44] or [6] ) to the information theory. By this interpretation any measurement process has two steps: (1) a preparation procedure E; (2) a measurement of a quantity B in the states φ which were prepared with the aid of E.
Let us consider these steps in the information framework. By E we have to select a statistical ensemble φ of I-transformers on the basis of some Icharacteristics. Typically in quantum physics a preparation procedure E is realized as a filter based on some physical quantity A, i.e., we select elements which satisfy the condition A = µ where µ is one of the values of A. We can do the same in quantum I-theory. An I-quantity A is chosen as a filter, i.e., Itransformers for the statistical ensemble φ are selected by the condition A = µ where µ ∈ Z p is some information. For example, we can choose A = p, the motivation, and select a statistical ensemble φ = φ(p = µ) of I-transformers which have the same motivation µ ∈ Z p . Then we realize the second step of a measurement process and measure some information quantity B in the state φ (p=µ) . For example, we can measure the I-state q of I-transformers belonging to the statistical ensemble described by φ (p=µ) . We shall obtain a probability distribution P(q = λ|p = µ), λ, µ ∈ Z p (a probability that I-transformer has the I-state q = λ under the condition that it has the motivation p = µ). It is also possible to measure the I-energy E of I-transformers. We shall obtain a probability distribution P(E = λ|p = µ), λ, µ ∈ Z p 9 . On the other hand, we can prepare a statistical ensemble φ (q=µ) by fixing some information µ ∈ Z p and selecting all I-transformers which have the I-state q = µ. Then we can measure motivations of these I-transformers and we shall obtain a probability distribution P(p = λ|q = µ).
Other possibility is to use a generalization of the individual interpretation of quantum mechanics. By this interpretation a wave function ψ(x), x ∈ R n , describes the state of an individual quantum particle. In the same way we may assume that a wave function ψ(x), x ∈ Z n p , on the I-space describes the state of an individual I-transformer τ.
Example 8.1. (Referendum). In some social models we can consider individuals as quantum I-transformers. A referendum is one of the possible measurement devices. Here the act of a measurement is a procedure of giving answers to questions of the referendum. By the individual interpretation individuals have no definite answers to these questions before the referendum. These answers (information communications) are created in the process of the referendum. In fact, this I-measurement changes I-states of individuals.
Example 8.2. (Conscious measurement of quantum subconsciousness) We might describe brain's functioning by the following quantum I-model. There is a quantum system, subconsciousness 10 , which state is described by the wave function ψ(x), x ∈ Z p . There is a measurement device, consciousness, which measures the I-state q of the subconsciousness. The concrete value (idea) of q is not determined before the act of the conscious measurement. It is created only at the instant of a measurement. Of course, this act of a measurement (as in the ordinary quantum mechanics) changes the state of the subconsciousness. The main difference from the standard quantum mechanical scheme is that we consider repeatable measurements over the same quantum system. In ordinary scheme of a quantum measurement we consider an ensemble of identical systems. At the moment we can present only some speculations about nature of the consciousness. The consciousness is an information field generated by the brain. This field interacts continuously with the subconsciousness 11 .
Example 8.3. ( Psychoanalysis). On the basis of the model of the previous example we can interpret psychoanalysis as a series of measurements of the I-state of the subconsciousness. These measurements continuously change the wave function of the subconsciousness. Thus psychoanalysis is a treatment based on the series of quantum I-measurements. In fact, psychoanalytic tries to provide some functions of the conscious field.
12 . The problem of interpretations is an important problem of ordinary quantum mechanics on real space. The same problem arises immediately in our quantum I-theory. We do not like to start our investigation with a hard discussion on the right interpretation. We can be quite pragmatic and use both interpretations by our convenience. However, the reader, who is interested in foundations of quantum mechanics, can find the extended discussion on the problem of the interpretation in Appendix 2.
In fact, a mathematical model for quantum I-formalism has been already constructed. This is quantum mechanics with p-adic valued functions, see [29] , [18] , [37] , [34], [35] . We present briefly this model. The space of quantum states is realized as a p-adic Hilbert space K (see [29] , [18] about the theory of such spaces). This is a Q p -linear space which is a Banach space (with the norm · ) and on which is defined a symmetric bilinear form (·, ·) : K × K → Q p . This form is called an inner product on K. It is assumed that the norm and the inner product are connected by the Cauchy-Bunaykovski-Schwarz inequality: |(x, y)| p ≤ x y , x, y ∈ K.
Remark 8.1 It is possible to use more general spaces over different extensions of Q p (analogues of complex Hilbert spaces).
By definition quantum I-state φ is an element of K such that (φ, φ) = 1; quantum I-quantity A is a symmetric bounded operator A : K → K, i.e., with the conscious field (this is the signal to stop the work of the dynamical system).
12 Thus Freud's theory [47] may be interpreted in the following way. If the interaction between the consciousness and subconsciousness is not sufficiently strong, the consciousness "cannot see" some attractors of dynamical systems located in the subconsciousness. Thus the consciousness cannot send to the subconsciousness the signal to stop iterations of these dynamical systems. These dynamical systems are continuously busy and they cannot be used for other purposes. Other possibility is that the general interaction is strong. However, the consciousness "cannot recognize" some attractor as a solution of a problem because a strong external information field (a taboo) might hinder to the interaction. Therefore a psychoanalytic has to find the hidden attractor and by this act the work of the corresponding dynamical system will be stoped. Of course, he must be isolated from the corresponding "taboo-field".
(Ax, y) = (x, Ay), x, y ∈ K 13 . We discuss a statistical interpretation of quantum states in the case of a discrete spectrum of A.
Let {λ 1 , . . . , λ n , . . .}, λ j ∈ Z p be eigenvalues of A, Aφ n = λ n φ n , φ n ∈ K, (φ n , φ n ) = 1. The eigenstates φ n of A are considered as pure quantum I-states for A, i.e., if the system of I-transformers is described by the state φ n then the I-quantity A has the value λ n ∈ Z p with probability 1. Let us consider a mixed state
By the statistical interpretation of φ if we realize a measurement of the I-quantity A for I-transformers belonging to the statistical ensemble described by φ then we obtain the value λ n with probability P (A = λ n |φ) = q 2 n . The main problem (or the advantage?) of this quantum model is that these probabilities belong to the field of p-adic numbers Q p . The simplest way is to eliminate this problem by considering only finite mixtures (19) for which q n ∈ Q p (the field of rational numbers Q is a subfield of Q p ). In this case the quantities P(A = λ n |φ) = q 2 n can be interpreted as usual probabilities (for example, in the framework of Kolmogorov's theory [48] ). Therefore we may assume that there exist (can be prepared) quantum I-states φ which have the standard statistical interpretation: when the number N of experiments tends to infinity, the frequency ν N (A = λ n |φ) of an observation of the information λ n ∈ Z p tends to the probability q 2 n . However, we can use a more general viewpoint to this problem. In book [29] a (non-Kolmogorov) probability model with p-adic probabilities has been developed. If we use a p-adic generalization of a frequency approach to probability (see R. von Mises, [49] ), then p-adic probabilities are defined as limits of relative frequencies ν N with respect to the p-adic topology 15 . The 13 In p-adic models we do not need to consider unbounded operators, because all quantum quantities can be realized by bounded operators, see [29] , [18] , [37] , [34] , [35] .
14 As in the usual theory of Hilbert spaces, eigenvectors corresponding to different eigenvalues of a symmetric operator are orthogonal. 15 It is quite surprising that in the p-adic framework we can obtain negative rational frequency probabilities [29] , [50] . On the other hand, negative 'probabilities' appear in quite natural way in many quantum models (see, for example, [51] - [53] ). P.A.M. Dirac was the first to introduce explicitly the concept of negative probability (in close connection with relative frequencies ν N ∈ Q and they can be considered, not only as elements of R, R ⊂ Q, but also as elements of Q p , Q p ⊂ Q.
By using the p-adic frequency probability model for the statistical interpretation of quantum I-states we may assume that there exists I-states φ (ensembles of I-transformers) such that the relative frequencies ν N (A = λ n |φ) have no limit in R, i.e., we cannot apply the standard law of the large numbers in this situation. Hence if we realize measurements of an I-quantity A for such a quantum I-state and study the observed data by using the standard statistical methods (based on real analysis), then we shall not obtain the definite result. There will be only random fluctuations of relative frequencies, see [29] , [50] .
Remark 8.2. Such a behaviour can be related to psychological experiments. Here the possibility of the use of p-adic probability models gives the important consequence for scientists doing experiments with a statistical I-data: the absence of the statistical stabilization (random fluctuation) does not imply the absence of an I-phenomenon. This statistical behaviour may have the meaning that this I-phenomenon cannot be described by the standard Kolmogorov probability model.
We now discuss other interesting implications of p-adic probability theory. There exists statistical samples [29] , [50] in which the frequencies ν N → 0, in the standard real topology, but ν N → α = 0 in Q p . In this case the usual (Mises) frequency probability P(A = λ|φ) = 0. This implies that we have to consider the event {A = λ|φ} (an observation of the information λ) as nonphysical event. However, from the point of view of the p-adic probability theory this is the physical event (of course, in the sense of I-physics).
The evolution of a p-adic wave function is described by an I-analogue of the concept of negative energy), [51] . R. Feynman also discussed the possibility to use negative probabilities in quantum formalism, see [52] . In particular, he remarked: "The only difference between a probabilistic classical world and the equations of the quantum world is that somehow or other it appears as if the probabilities would have to go negative, and that we do not know, as far as I know, how to simulate". These probabilities were used to explain violations of Bell's inequality (see review [53] ). Here the assumption that a distribution of hidden variables may be a signed 'probabilistic measure' implies existence of numerous models with hidden variables in that Bell's inequality is violated. Wiegner's distribution on the phase space gives other example of signed quantum 'probabilistic' distribution. In works [38] - [40] , [54] , [55] the p-adic probabilities (which are well defined on the mathematical level of rigorousness) were used to justify the use of negative probabilities in quantum theories.
the Schrödinger equation:
where m is the I-mass of a quantum I-transformer. Here a constant h p plays the role of the Planck constant. By pure mathematical reasons (related to convergence of p-adic exponential and trigonometric series) it is convenient to choose h p = 1 p . We may also present some physical arguments for such a choice. In ordinary quantum mechanics the Planck constant is related to the measure of discretization. The constant h p = 1 p is related to the level of discretization of information.
If we use the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics then the parameter t plays the role of common I-time for elements of a statistical ensemble of I-transformers described by the wave function. Therefore, to be able to describe the evolution of a quantum state ψ, we must have consistent I-times for elements of this statistical ensemble.
We use the factor i = √ −1 in (20), because we like to have the total coincidence with formulas of the ordinary quantum mechanics. As we have already noted, in the p-adic case the functions e iαx and e αx have the same (non-oscillating) behaviour. Therefore, in principle, we can use the analogue of (20) in that the factor i is omitted.
The use of i implies the consideration of the extension Q p (i) = Q p × iQ p of Q p . Elements of this extension have the form z = a + ib, a, b ∈ Q p . This extension is well defined for p = 3, mod 4. As usual, we introduce a congugation z = a − ib; here we have zz = a has the form 16 :
By the choice h p = 1/p this function is well defined for all x ∈ Z p and t ∈ Z p . As ψψ ≡ 1, this wave function describes the uniform (p-adic probability) distribution, see [29] , on the ring of p-adic integers Z p . Thus an I-transformer τ in the state ψ can be observed with equal probability in any state x ∈ Z p . In this sense behaviour of a free I-transformer is similar to behaviour of the ordinary free quantum particle. On the other hand, there is no analogue of oscillations:
Is it possible to reproduce oscillations with respect to ordinary real time on the basis of the information model? It could be done by a time scaling. Let f : Z p → Z p be an arbitrary continuous function. Then f (t + kp n ) ≈ f (t) for all k ∈ Z for sufficiently large n (uniformly for t ∈ Z p ). Let t phys = g(t) be a law of the correspondence between I-time t ∈ Z p and real time t phys ∈ R. If 2π = g(p n ) then the p-adic continuity will imply the periodicity in real time. Therefore, the ordinary wave behaviour is nothing other than a consequence of continuity of information flows and the appropriative choice of a time scale. Depending on a time scale an I-process may or may not exhibit wave behaviour in the real picture of reality.
We consider a psychological (and social) consequence of Example 8.4: in the absence of the external potential the same motivation p may imply any I-state x ∈ Z p .
Let us consider mixtures of states of the form (21) . We set t = 0. Let
If we compute < ψ, ψ >= Zp ψ(x)ψ(x)dx (where dx is a uniform p-adic valued distribution on Z p ) we see a large difference with ordinary quantum mechanics: < ψ, ψ > = a 1ā1 + a 2ā2 . There is nonzero correlation term. For α = (p 1 − p 2 )/h p , we have [18] :
Thus there are correlations between the motivations p 1 and p 2 in the state ψ. By using the individual interpretation of quantum mechanics we say that an I-transformer τ with the wave function ψ is in the superposition of two motivations p 1 and p 2 . Moreover, these motivations could not be measured exactly (compare with [18] , [33] ). Such a situation is natural for psychological and social phenomena. In fact, a psychological or social motivation may be not represented in the brain in the definite form before the act of a measurement (at least for some quantum information states). Moreover, it cannot be measured exactly. Such information measurements may be used as illustrations of the process of a measurement in ordinary quantum mechanics. By analogy we can say that the definite value of a physical observable is created in a long process of the interaction with an equipment. Moreover, it can be never measured exactly (compare with [56] - [57] ).
Example 8.5. (Quantum Hooke's system) To give an example of a Hamiltonian with discrete spectrum, we consider the formal p-adic generalization of the Hamiltonian of a harmonic oscillator:
where m is the I-mass. We consider ω simply as the coefficient of interaction (there is no analogue of harmonic oscillations). The operatorĤ has eigenvalues E n = h p ωn, n = 0, 1, ... (see [18] ). However, in the p-adic case the difference between continuous and discrete spectra is not so strong (for each E n , we have E n = lim k→∞ E l k , l k = n). On the other hand, discreetness of a spectrum, of course, induces some restrictions on values (information) which can be observed.
Appendix 1: Models of reality and number systems
Since Newton's time, we use a model of physical reality based on a description of all physical processes by real numbers. In fact, the use of real numbers is equivalent to the assumption that any physical quantity can be measured (at least in principle) with an infinite precision. We shall discuss this point more carefully.
To realize a measurement of a physical quantity x, first we have to fix a unit of a measurement l = 1. We assume that there exists such a natural number n that
This assumption is a mathematical postulate, the Archimedean axiom. Therefore by (22) we restrict our considerations to physical phenomena which can be described on the basis of the Archimedean mathematical model. We now consider the next step of the measurement process. If y 1 = (n − 1)l = x then we have to measure the quantity x 1 = x − y 1 by using a smaller unit of the measurement. Typically we fix a natural number m > 1 ( the scale of the measurement) and choose the new unit l 1 = l/m. Then we apply the Archimedean axiom (22) to the quantities x 1 and l 1 and obtain a natural number β 1 (β 1 = 1, . . . , m) ): (β 1 − 1)l 1 ≤ x 1 < β 1 l 1 . This procedure can be continued. If y 2 = (β 1 − 1)l 1 = x 1 then we can use the new unit of measurement l 2 = l 1 /m to measure the quantity x 2 = x 1 − y 2 and so on. We remark that
where α −k = β k − 1 = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1. To obtain the real numbers model for physical reality, we assume that the above process of measurements of every physical quantity x can be continued by an infinite number of steps. We call this postulate the postulate of an infinite precision of measurements or the Newton axiom. By this axiom any physical quantity x can be identified with the real number:
where α ±j = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1, (here the number (n − 1), see (23) , is also expanded with respect to powers of m).
Both the Archimedean and Newton axioms are natural for the description of an extended class of physical phenomena. The basis of the Archimedean-Newton model of reality is Newton's space which is continuous, infinitely divisible and infinitely deep. All physical objects are located in this space and their location can be determined (at least in principle) with an infinite precision.
It would be natural to develop other models of physical reality which are not based on the Archimedean and Newton axioms.
The quantum formalism is one of successful attempts to give a new model of physical reality. The Archimedean and Newton axioms cannot be applied to quantum observables. However, quantum theory uses the old mathematical basis, real numbers. Of course, such a situation when non-Archimedean and non-Newtonean phenomena are considered in "real" reality should induce paradoxes. One of such paradoxes is the EPR paradox which gives the right consequence, the death of reality (see, for example, [6] , [7] for the details).
In the present paper we started to develop a new model of reality, information reality, based on systems of m-adic numbers. This is a non-Archimedean model. Here we could not 'compare' two arbitrary information quantities x, y ∈ Z m . This is a non-Newtonian model. Information could not be 'measured with an infinite precision.' Information spaces are discrete. There always exists a 'minimal space length', a bit of information 17 10 Appendix 2. An interpretation of quantum information mechanics.
We shall discuss the problem of interpretation on the basis of an example of a cognitive quantum system. Our analysis of measurement processes for quantum cognitive systems implies that we have to use the ensemble interpretation. There are two main viewpoints on the ensemble interpretation. The first is based on realism (see, for example, [44] ). Here every physical quantity A pertaining to a quantum state φ which describes a statistical ensemble S has some definite value for each s ∈ S. The second is based on empiricism. Here it is not assumed the "objective existence" of definite values of A. The φ gives only probabilities that A would take some values (if a measurement of A is performed). In fact, in conventional quantum mechanics the ensemble interpretation is based on the stronger form of empiricism: it could not be assumed that A has definite "objective value" a for each s ∈ S. Our analysis implies rather strange consequences. On the one hand, we understood that it is impossible to interpret a quantum state φ on the basis of pure realism. On the other hand, we could not follow the conventional ensemble interpretation. On the one hand, a preparation procedure E b which can be realized as a filter with respect to values {b j } of an I-quantity B produces a statistical ensemble S (described by the quantum state φ) in which each individual I-system has some fixed (objectively existing) value b j . On the other hand, there exist I-quantities for which we cannot assume that their have definite ("objective") values for elements s ∈ S. If A is such an I-quantity, then its values are generated in the process of a measurement M a over elements of the S. This measurement does not imply a discontinuous collapse of the state φ to the state φ a corresponding to the fixed value a of A. In the contrary this value a of A is created in the long process of the interaction between an I-system and a measurement device 18 . There is the clear evidence that at least cognitive systems have hidden I-variables (I-states of the brain which are represented by configurations of excited neurons, see, for example, [62] , [63] ) which exist objectively and determine with some probabilities results of the M a . In fact, these hidden I-variables (at least some of them) are not longer hidden. The modern experimental neuroscience gives the possibility to observe configurations of excited neurons corresponding to different reactions (results of M a ), see, for example, [64] , [65] on experiments (based on functional magnetic resonance imaging machine) for memory neurons configurations.
18 Thus the φ is also related to individual I-systems. We can present the speculation that one of maps j mk gives the spatial distribution of information in a cognitive system (in the case of "one dimensional brain"). This spatial distribution can have quite exotic structure. For example, the image j mk (U r (a)) of a ball U r (a) can be a fractal (a kind of dusty set) in the real space. This model can have some connection with frequency domain methods [66] in that populations of cortical oscillators self-organize by frequencies; same-frequency subpopulations of oscillators can interact in the sense that a change in phase deviation in one will be felt by the others in the sub-population. Thus here the spatial nearness of neurons (and even the existence of synaptic connections between two neurons) does not guarantee that they interact. To simplify our considerations, we consider only states which provide the conventional (Kolmogorov) probability interpretation.
In what follows students can be considered as analogues of quantum particles and professors as analogues of measurement devices. Students of a University have to pass a test M. They have to give n answer to the question L. Denote the set of all possible answers {a j } to L by the symbol A. If we use the coding alphabet {0, 1, ..., p − 1}, then the elements of A can be presented by p-adic integers. To prepare to this test, students have to read one of books B = {b j } (here b j ∈ Z p are coding sequences for books); a student has no time for reading of more than one book. All books give a description of the subject; but these descriptions are not identical. The process of reading is considered as a preparation procedure E b . It produces a statistical ensemble S of students who have read a book b j ∈ B. The E b can be considered as a filter on the set of all students of University. By quantum formalism (with the ensemble interpretation) S is described by a quantum state φ (which is a vector in a p-adic Hilbert space). This state is presented in the form:
where c j = g j + if j , g j , f j ∈ Q and φ j is a quantum state which describes the statistical sub-ensemble S j of S consisting of students who have read the book b j . The number v j = c jcj gives the frequency of students s ∈ S j in S, i.e., proportional probability |S j |/|S| (where, for a set O, we denote its cardinality by the symbol |O|). The measurement M is the process of an interaction between a quantum Itransformer (student's brain) and a measurement equipment (professor's brain).
Brains are I-systems with very complicated internal structure. A result of interaction between the brain of a student s ∈ S and the brain of a professor cannot be uniquely determined by the information b j . Moreover, an attempt to verify the condition s ∈ S j (by an additional measurement) may change the result of the measurement M. Therefore the property to give the answer a k as a result of the measurement M is not an objective property of elements of the statistical ensemble S described by φ.
Remark 10.2. We may use the notion of potentia: each s ∈ S is potentially present in all states ψ k =(the answer a k to the question L). The interaction with the equipment induces a transition from possible to actual.
The state φ can be presented in the form:
where d k = m k + in k , m k , n k ∈ Q. Probability to obtain the answer a k is given by the standard formula u k = d kdk . We could not consider probability u k as probability with respect to a statistical ensemble. This is not proportional probability of the form |S ′ k |/|S|, where S ′ k is a statistical sub-ensemble of S. In fact, the expansion (26) provides a description of some properties of an individual system s ∈ S (reactions of s to the question L). However, we cannot assume that φ provides a complete description of the I-state of a cognitive system s. Thinking systems of students can be very different 19 .
As usual, we introduce a diagonal operator A in a p-adic Hilbert space, Aψ i = a i ψ i . The spectrum of A coincides with the set of answers A. This operator provides the quantum description of the measurement M.
As we have already noted, the act on the observation is a part of the measurement process M. In our example it is important that a student must give an answer to a professor. If we change the measurement procedure and consider a self-observation instead of an answer to the professor, then the states ψ i will be changed (with the corresponding change of probabilities).
Finally we have to remark that the quantum I-formalism can be used to construct a new model for Bohm's pilot wave theory. In fact our approach is quite adequate to ideas of D. Bohm and B. Hiley [67] on active information. Moreover, it seems that the ordinary pilot wave theory might be improved by considering the ψ-function field as a purely I-field.
